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Official Diary

Monday, 9 March 1953



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1. Various meetings with respect to the NSC briefings.

2. At the Deputies' meeting announced that we were having briefings with respect to CIA activities for various members of the IAC and would be delighted to have nominations for others to attend. We definitely intended 25X1A9a to invite and appropriate members of the NSC staff. Special clearance will be required. <u>25X1A9a</u>

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3. Chatted with DCI as to the results of his talk with on intelligence service for the President. The direct channel for the time being is to be through at the White House. Eventually we hope to have a CIA room at the White House. Later in the day these arrangeand myself.25X1A9a ments were discussed with bу

25X9A6 25X1A9a 4. Passed on to initial comments on the PSB paper respecting action to be taken in the light of Stalin's death. 25X1A9a

5. At the morning meeting it was agreed that DD/P complex would check with PSB as to action to be taken with respect to 25X6A the Finnish tanker WIIMA. I had pointed out that the WIIMA had been stopped nor the U.S. were doing by its owners at U.S. request, and yet anything respecting the cargo. Unless the U.S. took some action in this respect, the owners who had suffered substantial financial losses might could call 25X1A9a continue the voyage to China. It was understood that on me for assistance.

6. Attended O/NE Board meeting and expressed some dissatisfaction with the current draft of the estimate respecting probable consequences of Stalin's death. It did not seem to me that this estimate adequately dealt with the questions foremost in the policy makers' minds, namely (1) is the Soviet bloc weaker as a respect of this death and if so, what are its particular vulnerabilities, and (2) can any estimate be given as to the possible cors equences of action by the U.S., particularly diplomatic or psychological. 25X9A6

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25X1A9a of the Office of Secretary of Defense phoned respectt and I talked with about this. In a ing the meeting later in the day with we expressed the tentative CIA conclusion that we were not prepared to take over this project in whole or in part as an intelligence project. We did suggest the advisability of review of the possible R&D aspects of the project and also indicated a desire to be kept in touch with termination negotiations on the possibility that some intelligence value could be salvaged. I undertook to confirm this in writing.

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